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ABSTRACT
The topic of this thesis is a historical stucfy of selected controversial topics
within the broader phenomenon of political violence in Argentina during the
decade of the 1970s. A historical background from 1930 until 1969 (of the events
and political problems in Argentina) which prompted the formation of armed
guerrilla movements in order to create political change, is outlined in the first
chapter. The growth of the guerrilla movements and the evolution of their
respective political ideologies during the years 1970-75 are discussed in the second
chapter, which also discusses the relative success of the guerrillas in their armed
actions.
The third chapter examines the most debated aspects of political violence
in Argentina during the 1970s: the legitimacy of the Argentine military's illegal
and covert crackdown on "subversion" in the second half of the decade (1975-79).
Whether the military's campaign was a random attack against any opposition to
the military government, which came to power in March of 1976, or a necessary,
publicly supported form of bringing peace back to a country seemingly on the
verge of anarchy. Although no definite conclusion can be drawn upon these
issues, I raise various estimates and critique each group's methodology.
This paper relies heavily on primary sources such as personal interviews
iii
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This paper relies heavily on primary sources such as personal interviews
and official documents as well as the latest published revelations on the topics
which I compiled during my nine month stay in Argentina (January until
September, 1995), in order to give a first hand, non-biased perspective on the
topic. The conclusion, however, is based partfy on my personal observations on
the issue of the military's brutal campaign.

IV
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Argentina, a country which prides itself on Europeanness due to the
majority of its population^ being descendants of Italian, Spanish, French and other
immigrants who left Europe for the economicalty prosperous Argentina at the
turn of the twentieth century, has had a history of internal political turmoil and
subsequent military intervention.

Despite its wealth and its relative racial

homogeneity, in fact, Argentina shares many political characteristics with its
poorer and more ethnically diverse neighbors, such as Bolivia and Paraguay.^

The Pre-Peron Years: 1930-45
In the twentieth century the Argentine military has taken power six times
(1930,1943,1955,1962,1966 and 1976), but for the history of political violence
in Argentina, the events of 17th October, 1945 seem the first major move towards
widespread public discontent and uprising.
The first coup, led in 1930 by General Jose Uriburu, was a result of the
onset of the Great Depression and the public's demand for a new government
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with a better economic plan. The second coup, in 1943, led by General Arturo
Rawson, was bloodless like the first and widety supported by the public and
political parties alike.^ The coup of 1943 would be the beginning of the rise of
a military figure who would dominate Argentina's political scene until his death
in 1974, Juan Domingo Perdn. Peron, who had been bom on October 8, 1895,
to Italian immigrants, enjoyed a steacfy rise up the military ladder. His assignment
in Mussolini's Itafy from 1939 to 1941 would influence his nationalist, anti
communist and quasi-fascist political ideologies. From June 1943 until June 1944,
Peron would ascend from the rank of colonel to Minister of War, and then to
Vice-President in the government of General Edelmiro Farrel, who had taken
over as president in February 1944 but was considered only a military figurehead*.
During Farrel's tenure, Peron would choose the position of secretary of labor
rather than vice-president, as the best way to consolidate his power base among
the working class and Argentina's many unions.
1945 marked the end of World War H and the United States had finally
outpositioned the British in terms of influence in Latin America (although the
U.S. influence in Argentina was longstanding). The Truman Administration saw
the seemingly inevitable rise of Peron to the top of Argentina's government as
troublesome, not only due to his pro-Fascist tendencies, but also due to
Argentina's previous pro-Axis stance during the war (U.S. and Britain had
imposed numerous economic sanctions on Argentina because of its anti-allied

•rfft
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position). Farrel was not onfy coming under pressure from the American
Ambassador, Spruille Braden, to dismiss Perdn, but also from Argentina's
powerful oligarchy, who saw Peron's pro-labor policies as disastrous to their
interests which had flourished for so long under a system traditional^ not
concerned with working class rights. Farrel finally dismissed Peron from his
multiple posts in earfy October, 1945, and sent him to an island off the coast of
the capital, Buenos Aires.

The Perônist Years: 1945-55
It was on the 17th of October, 1945, that thousands of workers would flood
from all over the country to march on the government house (Casa Rosada),
demanding Peron's return.

In the face of such opposition, Farrel quickly

succumbed and brought Peron back to his multiple posts and announced formal
elections for February 1946 after which Perôn would be recognized as the official
leader of the country. The events of October 17th had solidified Perôn's position
as the leader of Argentina and ten years of Peronismo began.
These ten years (1945-55) can be divided into two parts; the Evita years
(1945-1952), and the post-Evita years (1952-1955). Evita (Eva Duarte de Perôn)
was bom in 1919 in Los Toldos, province of Buenos Aires, and had worked her
way up from poverty to become a radio and screen star. Shortly after meeting
Perôn in January, 1943 she married him and became his staunchest supporter.
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Through her broadcasts, she played a pivotal role in persuading the masses to
organize for the October 17th showdown, and when Peron became President in
1946, she was not only dubbed the "spiritual leader of the nation", she also acted
as the main figure in carrying out the pro-working class social reforms outlined
in Peronismo. Through the Eva Peron Foundation, an anti-aristocraqr campaign
was launched in which Evita gave money, clothes, land and other gifts taken firom
the wealthy to the workers who were the backbone of Peron's support. These
supporters were called the shirtless ones, or descamisados.
The Evita years were the golden age of Peronism, as not only did his wife's
positive international image ofrset prior concerns about the president's Fascist
tendencies, but also internally, the economy was in an upswing in terms of income
growth*^ largely due to the vast profits made by Argentina during and following
WWII in terms of exports to Europe (at this time, the country also had the largest
gold reserves in the world). Positive pro-worker laws were implemented which
emphasized higher pensions, extended holidays and restricted work schedules.
Shortly before Peron was elected to another six year term as President in the
elections of June 4,1952, Evita had suddenly become sick and frail, and she was
diagnosed with ovarian cancer. Evita passed away on July 26,1952 at the age of
33.
From this point on, Peron's presidency began to crumble. Many wavered
on their previous backing of Peron. Not only was his personal life in question.
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(he supposed^ took a 13 year-old mistress shortfy after Evitas death^), but his
economic policies also began to fail as most of the positive growth of years past
had begun to vanish due to the recovery of European agriculture and inefficiency
of nationalized industries. The final blow to Peron's power occurred when he
extended his repression of opponents all the way to the Catholic church. A
previous ally, the church denounced Peron's personal life and his move towards
legalizing divorce and prostitution as well as his banning of religious influence in
public schools.^
On June 16,1955, one of the bloodiest episodes of military intervention in
Argentine political history occurred, as naval planes bombarded Buenos Aires'
main plaza, (the Plaza de Mayo), which was filled with pro-Peronist demonstrators
urging Perôn to stay on in power; the result was 355 civilian casualties.^ Although
the navy failed to oust Perôn, (because the army was still backing him), this
unprecedented attack created a widespread fear of a civil war between pro and
anti-Perônist camps. Perôn had threatened civil war by claiming that for every
dead Perônist there would be five dead anti-Perônists‘"and, at the end of August,
a state of siege had been declared. In September, the army once again decided
to step in and take control of a politically unstable country. The coup started in
the cities of Cordoba and Bahia Blanca on September 16th, but Perôn did not
leave for exile in Paraguay until the 19th when the navy threatened to shell oil
installations in Buenos Aires, and its leader General Eduardo Lonardi was sworn
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in as President.
Although Lonardi was strongty anti-Perônist, he recognized that the
Perônists were too large a political force to be completely ignored in the political
process, and he considered allowing them to retain their voting rights. This was
unacceptable to the right wing of the military and, subsequently, Lonardi was
replaced by General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu in November of 1955, after a
period of irmer struggles in the armed forces. Aramburu quickly carried out the
demands of the vehement anti-Perônists by presenting a presidential decree
banning the Perônist party from any political activity as well as prohibiting anyone
from running again who had held office at the local or national level during
Perôn's tenure.

Endless Instability: 1955-69
Perôn was charged in absentia with corruption, treason and smuggling. His
main body of support, the General Confederation of Labor (Confederacion
General Del Trabajo or COT), was placed under military control. The degree of
anti-Perônist sentiment on the part of Aramburu's regime was so strong that
Perôn's name could not appear in the press (he was referred to as the "Fugitive
Tyrant ")" and public displays of Perôn and Evita were outlawed. An anti-Perônist
curriculum was introduced in public schools and Perônist slogans and insignias
were declared illegal.
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A special dilemma for Aramburu was Evita s corpse, which had been
preserved so that no decomposition would take place. Aramburu knew the power
that Evita s memory had over Perôn's supporters, and thought it best that the
bocfy be smuggled out of Argentina. The bocfy was being held secretly at the
CGT headquarters until 1956, when it was shipped to Italy and buried under a
false name. For 18 years, until 1974, when Evita s bo(fy was finally returned to
Argentina in 1974, the whereabouts of the corpse was not only a much-debated
mystery within Argentina, but also a raltying point for Perônists, who were
outraged at Aramburu's actions.^^ The degree to which Aramuburu was willing
to go to crush any pro-Perônist movement became clear in 1956, when a group
of officers and civilians led by General Juan Jose Valle staged a rebellion in the
province of Corrientes in protest against all the anti-Perônist measures. When the
rebellion failed, Valle and twenty-seven of his followers were executed. This was
the first time since the mid-nineteenth century that rebellion was punished by
death in Argentina."
Aramburu, however, did keep his promise of making a transition to
democracy, as in 1958 Arturo Frondizi was elected President. Frondizi's election
seemed to mark the beginning of a gradual return for Perônists, as Perôn's
endorsement from exile of Frondizi's campaign was seen as the major difference
in the outcome of the elections." But in 1962, this trend was reversed as the
military, fearing that Frondizi was becoming too pro-Perônist, removed him from
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power, replacing him with another civilian, Jose Guido. Although there was no
doubt that Guido was a mUitaiy puppet, the military preferred that no military
/unfa" be installed at that point.
In the period after Peron's departure in 1955, the armed forces had been
divided into two different political camps. One group, the "Blues" (Azules),
favored a return to constitutional government, but by aligning the Perônists
behind a new military leader. The other group, the "Reds" (colorados), were
vehement anti-Perônists who favored an indefinite military dictatorship. One
reason for the outcome of the 1962 coup, neither a military junta nor presidential
elections, was the nearfy equal power of these two factions; another was the need
to maintain the pretense of democracy to the international community for the
purpose of assuring eœnomic aid.
In 1963, the "Blues" had gained the upper hand in the military power
struggle and declared another election. This time, Arturo Ulia of the Radical
Party, UCR (Union Civica Radical), won the presidency, but with only a quarter
of the total vote, as up to twenty percent had followed Perôn's instructions and
cast blank ballots, thereby showing their dissatisfaction with all candidates in the
elections. Forty percent of the vote had been divided among forty-seven minor
parties which were ofkpring of major parties (including UCR itself)."
niia's tenure was plagued with problems as the economic difficulties which
had started in 1930, and which Perôn's nationalization policies had exacerbated.
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Consumer prices had risen at an annual average rate of thirty percent since
1955," and Ulia's lack of popularity among Perônists didn't help his efforts to turn
the economy around, as worker strikes became commonplace.
By the time General Juan Carlos Ongania staged a coup to overthrow Dlia
on June 28, 1966, the change was welcomed by a majority of Argentines. One
poll showed sixty-six percent of the population to be "happy" with the change and
only six percent to be opposed." The Argentine public had clearly grown tired
of the political and economic instability of the post-Perôn years (1955-1966)
during which five presidents, three civilian and two military, had been unable to
set a clear course for the nation.
From the onset of Ongania's arrival in office it became clear that this
military regime was not like those in the past, which had only short-term plans.
He stated that his regime would stay in power indefinitely (sin plazos) and he
declared "La Revolucion Argentina" (the Argentine revolution), a plan for the
regeneration of the economy, society and politics. Ongania wasted no time in
implementing an authoritarian plan in which all political parties were dissolved,
all forms of political activity were banned, the press came under the regime's
control and censorship commissions were set up to monitor films and television
broadcasts. The regime's obsession with communism and morality led to burnings
of those books deemed "Pro-Communist" and the closing down of some of Buenos
Aires' most popular cabarets.
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The first signs of violent repression by Ongania's regime occurred on Jufy
29, 1966, when the military participated in a crackdown on universities in what
became known as the "night of the long batons". Under a law passed in 1918, all
universities in Argentina were granted "autonomy"; and their grounds were off
limits to police and military forces. The university would be run by a "tripartite
council" of professors, students and alumni.
When Ongania announced the removal of the tripartite councils and the
appointment of government picked officials to run the universities, students, who
had been the only major group to oppose the Ongania coup, occupied one of the
buildings of the University of Buenos Aires in protest.

The military used

immediate force in removing all students and faculty from the building. In the
aftermath, more than thirty people were hospitalized and more than two hundred
arrested". Shortly afterwards, most of the presidents, deans, and faculties of
Argentina's eight national universities resigned in protest. This not only allowed
governmental control of the universities, but also gave the Ongania regime an
excuse for outlawing all student unions. Ongania's economic moves seemed
brighter than his political actions. The man he appointed as the minister of
economics, Adalbert Krieger Vasena, installed a plan which by 1969 had managed
to curb inflation and increase industrial growth and public investment.^ But in
May 1969, a public uprising in the industrial city of Cordoba, which became
known as the Cordobazo, would dramatically alter the Argentine political scene.

j
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The Cordobazo grew out of the government's decision to raise the price of
meal tickets at a northeastern university. A student was subsequent^ killed on
May 15,1969 in protests held in the city of Corrientes; this death would lead to
more demonstrations across the country. On May 17th, a student was killed in
the city of Rosario and on May 20th, another student was blinded by a grenade
in Cordoba. On May 29th, a general strike was called in Cordoba and students
and auto workers, unhappy with summary firings in the region's Renault car
factory, took to the streets.
What followed was two days of mayhem, as protestors burned shops, cars
and buses. When police cracked down on the protestors 14^' were killed and
hundreds wounded. The fallout firom the Cordobazo included the resignation of
Krieger Vasena, largely due to reluctance of foreign investors to invest money in
Argentina, which they saw as an increasingly unstable country.
The Cordoba uprising was only partially Perônist inspired, as some of the
auto workers unions were not CGT influenced, and many of the students were too
young to have any links to Perônism. Rather, the workers rose up because they
saw the Krieger Vasena plan as another in a long line of economic measures
which ultimately made the rich wealthier and the working class poorer by lowering
real wages. The students were clearly fed up with the academic repression that
had started with the night of the long batons, and they were also heavily
influenced by recent student protests in Paris (the evenements of 1968).“

_
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The Cordobazo led to another rift in the military ranks which was an
extension of the earlier rivalry between the "blues" and "reds". This time a hard
line faction wanted even stronger authoritarian rule, while another more liberal
faction wanted concessions made to protestors.
During the following months more unprecedented acts of violence
occurred. In June, Augosto Vandor, a pro-Perônist leader of the CGT, was
assassinated by unknown assailants. The next day, as American dignitary Nelson
Rockefeller planned his visit to Argentina, a series of supermarkets belonging to
his famity were bombed (no one claimed responsibility for the bombings), and in
September, large protests were held in the city of Rosario.
As Argentina prepared to embark on the decade of the 1970s, it was
evident that the country was in a great deal of turmoil. Yet no one could imagine
the terrible violence in the decade to come.
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CHAPTER 2
THE RISE OF THE GUERRILLAS
Between 1959 and 1969, there were various attempts made at waging rural
guerrilla warfare in Argentina. On the heels of the victory of the Sierra Maestra
guerrillas in Cuba (on New Year's Day, 1959), a group of roughly twenty people
established two guerrilla camps in the rural province of Tucuman in September
of 1959. This group, which called itself the Utunmcos,^ hzid as their objective the
removal of President Frondizi and the return of Perôn, but the group was
captured by police on Christmas day, 1959, and was never able to reorganize."
In 1963, a journalist named Jorge Ricardo Masseti began recruiting
members for the People's Guerrilla Army, EGP (Ejercito Guenillero del Pueblo).
This group with roughly thirty members operated for a short period of time in the
north of Argentina, but within a year all members were either captured, dead of
hunger or shot for desertion."
The violent actions taken after the cordobazo in 1969 (the Vandor
assassination and supermarket bombings), which are officially recorded as the first
violent acts of pro-Perônist guerrillas, remain a debated historical point as many
involved in the Perônist guerrilla movement put the responsibility for these acts
13
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on Ongania's regime.^

Birth of the ERP and Montoneros: 1970
The year 1970 marked the ofhcial beginning of the two guerrilla groups
which had the greatest impact on the political scene during the 1970s: the
Montoneros^ and the ERP (People's Revolutionary Army).
The Montoneros were founded by a group of four middle class, fervent
Catholic college students^ who had as their platform an armed struggle for a
workers regime modeled on Cuba. Intermeshed with this was their loyalty to
bringing back Peron and the memory of Evita.^ The ERP was founded by Mario
Roberto Santucho, a certified public accountant,^ who had spent considerable
time in Cuba in the 1960's and even visited the United States for two months in
1963. Contrary to popular belief, he was never a student at Harvard (although
that became a huge part of the "Santucho Myth" in the 1970s)^^ since he was still
not through with his accounting studies in Argentina at that time.
The effects of the unprecedented bloodshed of the 1955 coup and the
vehement anti-Perônist propaganda campaign that followed had a tremendous
effect on Argentina's youth. Roberto Perdia, who would later become one of the
heads of the leftist Peronist guerrilla organization, the Montoneros, recalls: "We
went from being taught in school that Evita was a saint to being taught that she
was a whore. '^^
A second event which greatly affected the young politically active
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Argentines of the 1970s, was the Cuban Revolution of 1959 led by Fidel Castro
and an Argentine doctor, Che Guevara. The situation in Cuba gave those
disaffected with social inequality and the seemingty endless struggle for power
between the military and cmlians in Argentina a new blueprint for how their
country should be run and a formula for taking power.
The 29th of May is National Army Day in Argentina and in 1970 the
Montoneros saw this day as a perfect time to start their armed battle. Their target
was none other than the retired General Aramburu, the man seen as responsible
for the bloodshed of 1955. The four founders of the organization, dressed as
military personnel, apprehended Aramburu while pretending to give him an escort
from his Buenos Aires apartment and took him to a remote farm in the province
of Buenos Aires, where he was given a "People's Tribunal", sentenced to death
and shot in the head. His body was found a few days later in the basement of the
rural house. Mario Firmenich, who is the onty remaining survivor of the incident,
has always referred to the execution as carrying out "the People's will."^^
To this day, this incident remains a controversial one. Many have the
theory that the abduction was carried out or a least sponsored by the Ongania
military government that was in place at the time, which saw the retired
Aramburu as a danger to the military's power because he held considerable
popularity in both military and civilian ranks.^ Firmenich, however, has shrugged
this off as the inability of the public to accept that four youngsters could pull off
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such a daring action and later go on to build a guerrilla force numbering in the
thousands/^
Mario Santucho had begun the building of the Revolutionary Workers
Party, PRT (Partido Revolucwnario de los Trabajddores) in the province of
Tucuman in the late 1960's, just after completing his studies at the University of
Tucuman. In July 1970, during the congress of the PRT, a resolution was passed
creating an armed wing of the party, named the People's Revolutionary Army
(ERP). The objective of this army was to destabilize the armed forces to make
possible the insurrection of the proletariat.^
The idea of a Trotskyist guerrilla movement was a truly unique one to
Latin America. The main reason Santucho chose this ideology as a platform may
have been to make an absolute distinction from the prevailing Peronist armed
movement that was starting to take place at the time (led by the Montoneros),
However, not all of the rank and file of the PRT-ERP had a Trotskyist political
background; communists, other leftists, and nationalists were among those who
saw Santucho's path as the best one for a revolution in Argentina.^^
According to surviving PRT/ERP members, Trotslty was never really seen
by the organization members in the same way the Peronists saw Peron (Che
Guevara was the main figure the ERP drew its inspiration from).^^ Santucho,
after meeting with prominent Argentine leftist theorist Nahuel Moreno in 1963,
took a liking to Moreno's idea of how Trotsltyism can and should be applied in
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Argentina, which involved uniting the industrial workers of greater Buenos Aires
with rural workers and farmers to oppose the "bourgeois state.^’
To build up their base of support, both the Montoneros and ERP had
similar target groups: Lower class workers (pbieros), students and trade union
syndicalists who had the ability to recruit large groups of workers into the
guerrilla organization. Both organizations were also full of middle class students
and college graduates; a majority of the ERP's original members were students
from the University of Tucuman (mostly friends of Santucho) who were engineers,
economists (including second in command Enrique Gorriaran Merlo) or pre-med
students. Both guerrilla organizations began a similar plan of action for carrying
out their goals: attacks on military barracks or police precinct stations by small
groups of armed guerrillas who would try to rob as many weapons as possible
while causing maximum casualties. Sometimes military or police personnel would
be targeted in public while off-duty. The guerrillas' most impressive operations
were those carried out in order to gain funds: numbers of banks were held up for
large sums of money and both domestic and foreign businessmen were kidnapped
and held for ransom.^
During the years 1970-73, the ERP was much more active in carrying out
operations than the Montoneros, even after the capture of Santucho on August 31,
1971, upon his arriving at a meeting of all the guerrilla factions in the city of
Cordoba. This meeting, which included other high ranking members of the ERP
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and Montoneros and the much smaller Revolutionary Armed Forces, FAR
(FuerzasAmuuiasRevolucionarios) and the Peronist armed forces, FAP (Fuerzas
Armadas Peronistas),*^ was raided by the local police who were tailing Santucho/^
There were the numerous kidnappings of foreign executives in Argentina during
1971 and 1972, in order to assure the release of not only Santucho but all the
other guerrillas who had been captured and sentenced to long jail terms by the
special judges created by the military government to deal specifically with the
"subversion". But even all the pressure brought forth by foreign governments
(especially those of Italy and England) could not assure the release of the
captured guerrillas. At this time, the death penalty was outlawed in Argentina but
according to Gorriaran Merlo, who was captured at the same meeting with
Santucho, torture was all too frequent, especially the use of a pointed electric
cattle prod (picana) which was lowered onto a bocty and released electrical shocks
to sensitive areas (usually the mouth, nipples, genitals).^^
Despite all this, the public in general seemed to welcome the resistance to
the seemingly endless succession of military rule. A poll in 1972 showed that 45
percent of the residents of greater Buenos Aires justified the guerrillas' action.^
In poorer, rural areas the guerrillas often had a Robin Hood type role. Miguel
Molfino, one of the original members of ERP in the rural province of Chaco,
remembers how the local organization's activities in the early 1970s consisted of
hijacking trucks carrying milk and distributing them in the shanty towns of the
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province where the ERP was perceived as heroes/^
The major figures of the guerrilla organizations were moved in earty 1972
to a prison in the city of Rawson, in the Patagonian province of Chubut, and
there they carefulty planned their escape.^ On August 15,1972, twenty-five of
the guerrillas, divided into one group consisting of the six leading figures and
another of nineteen followers, made their daring escape attempt from the prison.
Only the first group, which included Santucho, Merlo and Fernando Vaca Narvaja
(one of the heads of the Montoneros) managed successfulty to leave Argentina.
They hijacked a plane at the Trelew Airport and took it to Chile, which at that
time had a government led by Salvador AUende, a social democrat. The other 19
escapees were captured at the airport and a week later, on August 22nd, sixteen
of the nineteen were reported dead, shot according to the government, while
making another escape attempt. The three survivors, however, described what
occurred as an execution.*^
The aftermath of this incident was tremendous pressure on the military to
step down in favor of a democracy. By earty 1973, Juan Perôn finally decided to
return to Argentina from exile in Spain in order to take part in the democratic
elections conceded by the military regime for later that year. The person chosen
to be the temporary president was Dr. Hector Campora, a dentist with long-time
ties to the Peronist movement.
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Amnesties, Ezeîza and the Triple-A: 1973
Upon taking over from General Lanusse, Campora put out an amnesty law
for all imprisoned guerrillas and on May 25, 1973, 371 political prisoners were
freed. The thousands who celebrated this day in Plaza de Mayo shouted a slogan
at the military persoimel who were vacating the government house and which
would later prove ironic: They're going, they're going and never coming back!"
(Se van! Se van! Y nunca volveran!).^
Thus ended seven years of military rule (1966-1973) and there was a great
deal of optimism as far as the possibility of ending political violence in Argentina.
By this time, the major guerrilla organizations had gained ever increasing support.
During the brief interim presidency of Campora, pro-guerrilla propaganda was
freely and openly displayed throughout the streets of Buenos Aires and other
major cities. The prisoners who had benefitted from the amnesty were welcomed
back as heroes and there were public marches by the Montoneros and open news
conferences held by Santucho and other ERP leaders.^^
While in Spain, Peron's second wife, Isabel, came across a mysterious figure
who would slowly but surely gain complete control over both her and Perôn. He
was Jose Lopez Rega, whose fascination with the occult, especially astrology, had
earned him the nickname "The Sorcerer" (El Brujo). Lopez Rega had very
distinct visions for the direction in which the Peronist movement should go after
Peron's return. He was in the Peronist extreme right, which was deeply troubled
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by the "Marxist infiltration" of the Peronist movement by the Montoneros. Before
leaving Spain, he arranged for a band of armed thugs in Argentina to combat the
Montoneros who were coming to Ezeiza International Airport to greet Perôn.
What followed on June 20,1973, was a complete disaster. More than a million
people had come to welcome Perôn back, yet they were caught in the crossfire of
the extremist organizations. The aftermath was more than 200 deaths.^ This was
a true turning point in the cycle of violence in Argentina in the 1970s, as it
became clear that even the return of Perôn wasn't going to bring peace.
Shortly after the Ezeiza massacre, the ERP went back into clandestinity
and once again began armed operations. On the 13th of July Campora resigned
and turned over the government to Raul Lasitiri, Lopez Rega's son-in-law. Even
before Perôn was inaugurated on October 12, 1973 after receiving an
overwhelming majority of the votes with Isabel as his vice presidential candidate,
Lopez Rega's band of armed followers, the AAA, (Argentine A nti-C ommunist
Alliance, Alianza Anti-Communist Argentina), went into action carrying out hits
on the Perônist left.

Not only the Montoneros and ERP, but prominent

syndicalists, writers and priests were targeted. The most prominent assassination
by the AAA was that of Jose Rucci, the head of the Congress of Workers, CGT,
on the 25th of September, 1973, although it was officially blamed on the
Montoneros.^^
In reality, the Montoneros were still content with Perôn's return and
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concentrated on building better relations with Peron and even the military. It had
become clear to everybocty that Peron's death was imminent due to his
increasing^ bad health, and the guerrillas and the armed forces saw a need for
cooperation after Perôn's death. The army and the Montoneros embarked on a
joint operation titled Operation

in October of 1973, where 800 members

of the Perônist youth branch of the Montoneros (Juventud Awnfrm), joined 5,000
army members to undertake a public works project in Buenos Aires which lasted
for 20 days.”
The army had stayed away from combating the guerrillas up to that period
and had no interest in combat in the post-Perôn period. The feeling within the
army was that any internal terrorism should be left to the Federal Police and the
courts to handle.”
The degree to which the guerrillas were gaining strength during this period
is evident. Nearty 50,000 people attended a Montoneros rally in a soccer stadium
in Buenos Aires on March 11,1974” , and in January 1974 an unprecedented 80
ERP guerrillas headed by Gorriaran Merlo attacked an army barracks in the town
of Azul in the province of Buenos Aires.” By this time, Perôn was under steady
pressure from Lopez Rega who had been named Minister of Welfare and
operated the Triple-A out of the Ministry of Welfare building in downtown
Buenos Aires.” Finally, on May Day (May 1st, 1974) Perôn finally broke ranks
with the Montoneros.
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During a gathering of approximate^ 100,000 supporters in the Pkza de
Mayo, he labeled the Montoneros as "traitors and infiltrators." After these
remarks the Montoneros left the plaza and the audience was cut in half. A week
after the event some of the leading Monteneros held a meeting with Peron to try
to smooth the tension in the Perônist ranks. This meeting was not successful,
however, as the overwhelming influence of Lopez Rega made it impossible for
Perôn to make any concessions to leftist branches of his movement.” On July 1,
1974, Juan Perôn passed away at 78 years of age, his cause of death being
pneumonia. As hundreds of thousands of Argentines paid their last respects to
Perôn, his wife Isabel, who had held the position of vice president, was sworn in
as Latin America's first female president. Her tenure, which lasted until March
24, 1976, would be one of unimagined public unrest and violence.

Tucuman: What Really Happened?
The province of Tucuman is located in the North of Argentina (bordered
by the province of Santiago del Estero, Santucho's birthplace). This area is often
arrogantly referred to as Argentina's "gateway to Latin America" by the portenos
of Buenos Aires,” and is also the location of Argentina's declaration of
independence from Spain on the 9th of July, 1816.
Like other northern provinces, it is poverty-stricken, densely populated, and
although partly mountainous, dependent on sugar as its main source of income.
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AU these factors seemed to indicate to Santucho that Tucuman was the perfect
place to start a Cuban type revolutionary movement, as the mountains and sugar
cane fields could be an ideal hideout for guerriUas and popular support could be
gathered from dissatisfied workers.
For years, the true nature of and facts about the guerrUla campaign
launched by the ERP in the province of Tucuman during Isabel Perôn's
government has been in doubt. The military would use the claim that one third
of the province was under guerriUa control as a measure of the guerriUas threat
to the state and as a justification for the brutal campaign launched by the mUitary
in the province beginning in February of 1975, titled Operation Independence
(Operativa Independencia). In 1995, in an interview with the program "60
Minutes ", current Argentine President Carlos Menem went as far as stating that
the whole province was under ERP control,” while others claim that the situation
was vastly blown out of proportion and that the guerriUas in reaUty numbered
only a few dozen.
The ERP campaign that officially began the same day that Perôn died was
truly an ambitious one; one of its goals was the creation of "liberated zones "
where smaU towns and viUages of Tucuman would temporarily be taken over by
a band of guerriUas and declared a "free zone", with the hope that these zones
would receive official international recognition as separate from the rest of
Argentina. The other goal was the destabilization of Isabel's government to the
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point that the military would have to take over once more, to set up the final
showdown.
In Santucho's opinion, this would lead to an all-out civil war and a final,
decisive battle for control of Argentina between the armed forces and the armed
guerrilla factions. This tactic would prove to be a resounding failure, however,
as no international recognition was ever given to any of the liberated zones and
the presidential decree of February 1975, which gave the army the order to
"neutralize and/or annihilate" the subversive elements in Tucuman by launching
Operation Independence would be the beginning of the brutal yet largely
clandestine campaign waged by the military in their Dirty War. Until February
1975, the armed forces had had no direct role in the political violence; the federal
police were the main anti-guerrilla enforcement organization.”
According to the locals, the estimate that one third of the province was
under ERP control is exaggerated because the mountain guerrillas had a strategy
of frequent movements through different zones and then making a timety strike
on the armed forces. The guerrillas never really controlled a significant amount
of land because they could not take complete control of a strategic location (such
as a village) for an extended period without having to face a direct assault by the
army, for which they had neither the manpower nor the equipment. The muchdisputed quantity of guerrillas in Tucuman may be impossible to pinpoint, yet
Gorriaran Merlo put the figure at 600 in the beginning of 1975, before the
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military's entrance into the province. This figure may not be a reliable one
because by the end of 1974 Merlo had been removed firom the leadership branch
of the ERF by Santucho for "abuse of power", stemming firom his involvement in
the execution of an ERP member suspected of being a government agent, and
therefore did not have direct knowledge of in the events of Tucuman.^'
Perhaps a more reliable figure is that o f200 to 300 guerrillas, as estimated
by General Mario Benjamin Menendez (who later headed the Argentine troops
in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war against the United Kingdom) who in 1975
served a tour of duty in Tucuman as an army colonel.”
The statement by President Menem claiming complete ERP control of the
province is completely unfounded since the guerrillas never managed a campaign
to capture the province's capital, San Miguel de Tucuman. The most significant
operation carried out by ERP in Tucuman was the attack on the village of
Manchala on May 28,1975 in which one hundred forty-three guerrillas (of whom
17 were killed) participated.” Yet even in this attack, the ERP was unsuccessful
in overrunning the village, being pushed back into the mountains.
The events in Tucuman and a total overview of the Argentine armed forces'
tactics used in the "Dirty War" do not clarify the exact origin of the term "Dirty
War" (La Guerra Sucia). However, it was favored by the military in describing the
methods used by the guerrillas in their campaign. It is clear that the ferocity of
the military was completely underestimated not only by the public but also by the
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guerrillas.

When the army arrived in Tucuman it set up 14 clandestine

concentration camps, not onfy for captured guerrillas but also anyone suspected
of being a sympathizer.” Those who before this point had openly favored ERP's
cause without fear of retribution would become the first of the many
"disappeared" (Desaparacidos).
See Figure 1 below.
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The statistics below also show a rather decisive rout of the ERP by the
military in the Province of Tucuman, by comparing the relative number of
casualties by both sides:
Table 1: Tucuman Casualty Figures
Official Number
of Casualties of
the Armed and
Security Forces

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

Official Number
of Disappeared
According to
National
Commission on
the Disappeared
(CONADEP)

Official Number
of Subversive
Casualties as
Reported by the
Armed Forces

•

3

-

-

•

-

-

4
23
1
1

-

»

-

106
304
27
4

-

-

147
95
•

-

■

Total number of casualties of the
Total number of attacks attributed to
armed forces and security forces
subversion (1970-1979)
51
(1970-1979)
32
Total number of casualties of the
armed forces during Operation
Independence (Operativa
Independencia) 2/75-2/76

9

Total number of subversive casualties
in Tucuman (1970-1979)
242
Total number of disappearances
attributed to the armed forces (19701979)
565

Year

Source: National Commission on
the Disappeared (CONADEP), Las
Cifras de la Guerra Sucia (1985), 44.
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By October 1975 it had become clear to Santucho that the Tucuman
endeavor was a lost cause, as his rural guerrillas had suffered heavy losses in
causalities and equipment. At this juncture he decided to join the Montoneros,
who had been more successful in their urban warfare since Perôn's death, to form
the Organization for the Liberation of Argentina, OLA (La Organizacion para la
Liberacion de Argentina).^
Eighty percent of disappearances in Tucuman occurred after the coup of
March 1976, when there was no guerrilla force to speak of, nor even a single
death attributed to subversion; in fact. Operation Independence had ended in
February 1976. After the operation was officially terminated. General Acdel
Vilas, who had headed the operation, was replaced by General Antonio Domingo
Bussi. The province was not yet completely free of subversive influence during
the years 1976-1977 (after the military coup), as Montonero reinforcements were
sent to Tucuman not for combat, but rather to infiltrate and recruit workers
within the factories and sugar cane fields to join the organization in their battle
against the military dictatorship.” During the period of military rule a huge "civil
action" campaign was launched in Tucuman, headed by Bussi, during which many
hospitals and schools were built and the province's public debt was forgiven by the
dictatorship.” The majority of the repression and disappearances in Tucuman,
therefore, was not directed at the ERP, but at suspected Montoneros and their
collaborators.
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The Urban Battles
In hindsight, Mario Firmenich has declared the decision made by the
Montoneros on September 6,1974, to go back to clandestinity and take up arms
against the constitutional government of Isabel Perôn was a "grave error".™ Yet,
during the first few months of renewed battles against the government, and
particularly against Lopez Rega's Triple-A, the Montoneros carried out a number
of dramatic operations. One of the most spectacular was the September 1974
kidnapping of the Bom brothers (Juan and Jorge), heads of the Bunge & Bom
Company in Argentina, who were released in exchange for an unprecedented $60
million ransom.^* On Febmary 28,1975, John Patrick Egan, the American consul
in the city of Cordoba, was shot to death by his Montonero captors after being
kidnapped and forced to make anti-American statements.™ These two acts finally
focused heavy intemational attention on the extent of political violence in
Argentina. In July 1975, U.S. Senator Jessie Helms would pay a visit to Buenos
Aires to meet with the leading military figures. In these meetings, Helms would
convey the Ford administration's outrage at the Egan kidnapping and the
American desire to end the leftist guerrilla threat in Argentina.
The Montoneros, like the ERP, had a mUitaiy coup as their objective and
toward the end of 1975 it had become clear that the constitutional government
was on its way out. In July, Lopez Rega was forced into exile (given the
ambassadorial post in Spain), due to pressure put on Isabel by both the military
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and the syndicalist sector of the Peronist movement. This marked the end of the
Triple-A; the exact number of casualties caused by this organization is impossible
to calculate because officially it never existed, but the general figure is as high as
2,000 murders,™ many of which were committed on the streets of Buenos Aires
during daylight hours in view of many bystanders.
Although there were lists of Triple-A members apparently in the possession
of the military,^* no one was ever prosecuted for the Triple-A's crimes. Lopez
Rega, who after spending many years in exile (including time in the United
States) returned to Argentina in the late 1980's, never stood trial due to ill health
(he died in 1989).™ Now the military was in charge of "fighting subversion" and
when Isabel was forced to take a leave of absence in October 1975 due to
"exhaustion," the interim president, Italo Luder, a respected Peronist figure, issued
a presidential decree (2770/71/72) which would later become a focal point of the
military's justification for the methods used to wipe out the so-called subversives.™
The decree extended "the authorization to the armed forces to execute the
military and security operations that would be necessary to annihilate the actions
of subversive elements in all the country." The remarks made by the head of the
army. General Jorge Rafael Videla (appointed in August, 1975), during the
conference of the Armies of the Americas in Montevideo, Uruguay held in late
October of 1975, was an ominous warning of what was to come: "If needed, all
the necessary persons will die in order to achieve peace in Argentina.™
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When the junta members were put on trial in 1985 for the human rights
violations that occurred during 1876-83 military dictatorship, they used the term
"annihilate" as meaning to kill; yet when Luder testified at the trial,™ he stated
that the decree meant that the infiastructure of the armed organizations should
be destroyed according to law. The military's operations were carried out
clandestinely and without any judicial proceedings for the "subversives".
Furthermore, the coup of 1976 meant that the decree was no longer legally valid
after March 24, the beginning of the period when the majority of disappearances
and other human rights violations took place.

The End of the ERP Army
The 23rd of December 1975 (Good Sunday) would mark the biggest and
most daring urban guerrilla operation ever in Argentina, as up to 250 ERP
guerrillas would storm the army's largest anununition depot in the Buenos Aires
suburb of Monte Chingolo. This was an attack expected by the army, as one ERP
member who was a double agent Jesus Rainier, had already tipped off the army
of the impending attack. After a short yet bloocfy battle the ERP was forced to
retreat in defeat, leaving behind 49 casualties.™ By this time Santucho had finally
come to grips with the fact that the setbacks in Tucuman had handicapped the
ERP's military capability, and this attack was a kamikaze effort to replenish arms
desperately needed to continue the guerrilla warfare. This resounding defeat
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marked the end of ERP as an armed, military threat to the state.
Although the Monte Chingolo disaster was not the end of PRT-ERP as an
organization (later in this essay there is an outline of how the organization was
dismantled after the military takeover), this attack had just as big a psychological
impact as a military one. One former army officer compares what happened in
Monte Chingolo with a hypothetical attack on the U.S. army headquarters in
Quantico, Virginia, since the distance firom Quantico to Washington D C. is
roughly the same as Monte Chingolo to downtown Buenos Aires.”
The scale of the attack not only put a huge fright in the 10 million
residents of greater Buenos Aires, it made the army even more anxious to unleash
a full scale war against the guerrillas. Five days before the Monte Chingolo
attack, the army had refused to give its support to a coup attempt by the far rightwing of the Air Force (led by Brigadier Jesus Capellini), as Videla still held out
hope for the possibility of a civilian resolution, although the scheduled
presidential election was still 11 months away (November 1976).^^ Two days after
the Monte Chingolo attack (on Christmas day), Videla issued an ultimatum to
Isabel Peron for her to regain control of the country within 90 days or the military
would take over” (Videla kept his word, as the coup took place exactly 90 days
later).
This period had a very ominous feel as the violence continued. In the city
of Cordoba there were 32 kidnappings” during January and February of 1976; the
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Montoneros, who apparentfy still saw the federal police as their enemy, killed 13
and wounded 10 policemen during the same period. In the week before the coup
there were 42 deaths officially attributed to left and right in the terrorists; there
was an estimate of a bomb explosion every 3 hours in the country and a political
killing every five hours.”
Some of the personal accounts of this period are rather remarkable. Noted
Argentine journalist Rogelio Garcia Lupo describes how on a visit to Allende's
Chile in early 1973 he saw that many walls in Santiago had the word "Jakarta"
spray painted on them (in reference to the 1965 military coup in Indonesia which
left approximately half a million casualties) in anticipation of what was to come
in September of that year (Allende's bloocfy overthrow). Now, during the first few
weeks of 1976, many walls in Buenos Aires had "Chile" spray-painted on them as
an eerie forecast of the inevitable coup to come.”
ERP member Miguel Molfino remembers how upon arriving in the capital
towards the end of 1975, T here seemed to be a smell of death on the streets. "
By the middle of March the expectation of the coup had reached a level of
absurdity, as newspaper vendors yelled out. T h e coup has been delayed for
another day" according to the headlines. The last hope for a civilian resolution
was destroyed on March 16th when the leader of the Radical Party, Dr. Ricardo
Balbin, stated on national television that "I have no solutions."”
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THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL REORGANIZATION 1976-83
Eight days after Balbin's comments, the long awaited coup was executed
quietly and without bloodshed (in what was called operation Aries), as Isabel
Peron was arrested by Air Force Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo (who later in 19811982 would join the ruling junta as the head of the Air Force) after being forced
to step oft a helicopter that had taken off from the government house.” She was
taken to the Patagonian province of Neuquen, where she would spend the next
five years imprisoned until given an anmesty in 1981; she then returned to Spain.”
Thus began the process of national reorganization (El Proceso de Reorganizacion
Nacional). The ruling military junta (the joint heads of state) was composed of
Army leader Videla, (also given the official post of Presidency), Navy Chief
Emilio Massera and Brigadier Orlando Agosti as the Air Force representative.

Were the Coup and Repression for Economic Reasons?
Volumes can be and have been written on how and why a country with
such vast natural resources such as Argentina has been caught in an economic
quagmire for most of the 20th century, yet undoubtedly the absolute economic
35
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fceefall that occurred during Isabel Perdn's govemmentwas as unprecedented and
out of control as the political violence that was occurring at the same period.
By March 1976 the inflation rate, which had been 335 percent the year
before, was running at an annual rate o f800 percent, the highest inflation rate in
the world at that time.” The new military regime would need a dramatic turn
around economically to maintain any level of public support, and the person
chosen for this task, after a series of meetings in early 1976, was Dr. Jose Alfredo
Martinez de Hoz.
Martinez de Hoz came from one of Argentina's most distinguished
"oligarchical "families. He was educated at Eton, Harvard and MIT and his father
had been president of the Sociedad Rural (the Society of Landholders). Although
a lawyer by profession he had alreacty served a brief term as Economics Minister
in 1963, and when approached by the military chiefs in 1976 was the head of the
Acindar Steel Group, Argentina's largest private steel company.™
The economic plan that he unveiled on April 2, 1976 would truly be
revolutionary as its undermined all the foundations of post-World War II
economics in Argentina. State control of industry and protectionism for trade
unions were originally implemented by Peron during his First term as president
and even while he was in exile, these policies for the most part stood in place.
Martinez de Hoz called for large scale privatization of state-owned industries, a
temporary freeze on real wages for workers, lifting of all price and exchange

• i ________________
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controls and tariff reductions for some import products.’*
When asked today if the coup of 1976 was an economic one, Martinez de
Hoz replies that it was "a coup for all reasons."”

This may be true, since the

entire fabric of Argentine society was falling apart under Isabel's regime; yet it is
also clear that implementing the new economic plan was higher on the Junta's list
of priorities than their anti-subversive campaign, since the armed forces could
have carried on their clandestine repression indefinitely with Isabel in power.
As to how much of the post-coup repression was economic related, the
Junta's takeover of all trade unions and the outlawing of strikes and the
subsequent crackdown on trade union heads (sindicalists) and workers (pbreros)
during 1976-78 suggest a definite link, as does the fact that nearly half of the
disappeared (48 percent) were workers (30 percent blue collar obreros and 18
percent white collar professional.” In analyzing the anü-obrero campaign, it is
important to note that the industrial workers were the main target group for
recruitment by both the ERP and Montoneros. Strikes and industrial sabotage
were especially used by the Montoneros, and this influence would last even after
the organization's military defeat in 1979. In that year, with Videla still the
President and Martinez de Hoz in charge of the economy, violent repression of
strikes ended.”
The other issue in which the military repression became entangled with
Martinez de Hoz's economic plans was unemployment, as the military Junta had
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made it clear to the economics minister that unemployment should be kept at a
minimum since probabfy a huge number of newfy-laid off workers would greatly
benefit Montonero recruitment.
Martinez de Hoz was successful in meeting this challenge by keeping the
unemployment in single digits throughout his term (1976-81).”

An Overview of the "Dirty War" 1975 - 1979
In determining the exact dates of a war which is fought by two sides, the
point where one side becomes completely unable to fight is the ending of the
conflict. In the case of the "Dirty War", Operativa Independencia in Tucuman in
1975 was the beginning and November 1979, which saw the last subversive attack,
according to the military, is the reference point as the end of the repressive
campaign waged by the armed forces.”

During the process of National

Reorganization, the military, however, would not give up its main form of antisubversive operations, the disappearance of civilians, until the last days of El
Proceso. Even in 1983, with democratic elections scheduled to take place, there
were still a few disappearances.” El Proceso ended on the tenth of December,
1983.
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Table 2: Casualty Figures of the Dirty War
Year

Deaths attributed
to Subversive
Action

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Total

4
24
26
49
120
179
293
70
18
7
-

790

National
Commission on
the Disappeared
Detained'
Disappeared
(CONADEP)

Civilian Deaths |
in Supposed
Confrontations
with Security
Forces

6
5
18
46
359
4105
3098
969
181
83
19
12
9
8910

•
-

•

564
1277
555
63
3
-

-

-

^

............................-

Source: Las Cifras de la Guerra Sucia (1985) page 32.

The military's brutality and complete disregard for human rights during the
El Proceso is extremely well documented: 341 clandestine camps or PACS
(Prisoner Assessment Centers) were set up throughout the country (see Figure 2).
Officially, 8,910 civilians would disappear to go along with 2,462 recorded deaths
(as reported officially in the newspapers ) of subversives in the hands of the
military (see Figure 3).
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Interestingly enough, almost none of the 3,000 official political prisoners
at the time of the March, 1976 coup would disappear during the military
government; they accounted for just 0.4 percent of the disappeared.^^ The reason
for this was that once these prisoners were officially incarcerated, their
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disappearance could not be denied by the military government. In the case of
civilians who had not been arrested, the military could give various excuses, the
most popular being the secret flight of the suspected disappeared into foreign
exile, to clear itself of responsibility for the disappearance.

Why the Disappearances?
The means used by the Argentine armed forces in the Dirty War"
(disappearances, torture and/or executions) have always been traced to the
training of Argentina military personnel by French officers with experience in
Algeria and Indochina in fighting guerrilla operations, as well as American
influence in applying methods used in Vietnam against the Vietcong. Yet in
reality, these means had been practiced on a much smaller scale by the local and
federal police departments against suspected criminals.
Upon sizing power, the military government reinstated the death penalty
for anyone who killed or injured security forces personnel or attacked public
utilities. Why, then, did the military decide to keep its anti-subversive action
outside the law? The 1973 Campora amnesties had shown that the guerrillas were
not going to give up the armed struggle, no matter how much time they would
spend in prison, since eventually the military would have to return power;
therefore, killing them was the only effective deterrent. Second, the justice system
was no longer able to effectively punish the guerrillas due to assassination of
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judges and threats against a judge's families by guerrillas. Finalfy, the thousands
of judicially sanctioned executions needed to bring back peace to the country
would complete^ discredit the government. The recent events of the 1973 coup
in Chile where a very public crackdown on leftists had raised international
condemnation and also the Pope's criticism, had shown the Argentine military the
consequences of a public anti-subversive campaign. On an international scale it
would endanger outside economic assistance to Argentina as well as put the
country’s long-awaited turn to host the world’s biggest sporting event, the World
Cup of Soccer, set for 1978.

How Fair was the Military’s War?
The answer to this question, while it may never be completely known, is
still evolving today. The real number of the disappeared is a much debated
issued. The human rights group, the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, who every
Thursday since April of 1977 have protested in front of the Government House
for their disappeared children’s return, completely reject the official figure of
9,000 put together by the National Commission on Disappearances (National
Commission on the Disappeared) in 1984.^ According to the Mothers, the figure
is closer to 30,000.^^ Yet due to fear of another military government, thousands
of families have not yet reported the disappearances of their loved ones.
There are many contradictions in trying to get an overall estimate of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43
real figure of disappeared. For example, in Tucuman, in the mountains where the
ERF once fought, some locals speak of dozens of unreported missing, while in the
city of San Miguel, the capital of Tucuman, nobocty seems to know of such cases.
Yet, the fact that all of the disappeared were not reported in 1984 to National
Commission on the Disappeared is clear by the 1995 release of a list by the
Argentine govermnentof 290 names not originally given to National Commission
on the Disappeared due to the fears of the families of the disappeared.'"^
The consensus figure among retired military personnel of the Dirty War era
is roughly 6,000 disappeared who were eventual^ executed. According to the
former soldiers, the rest on the National Commission on the Disappeared list are
either still in exile or living in Argentina with new identities since the military
government put collaborators in a program similar to the American Witness
Protection Program.'*®
Since throwing bodies into the ocean from airplanes or cremation were
preferred methods of disposing of the disappeared (the rest were buried as no
names, NN (Ningun Nombre), official military lists may be the only way to solve
this debated figure. According to Human Rights actwist Emilio Mignone, in a
1978 meeting with Admiral Massera, he was told by Massera that although
complete lists of the disappeared existed, they could not be released because the
other two junta members (General Videla and Brigadier Agosti) did not approve
of such an action.
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By taking a common sense approach, one can see that he notion of 20,000
unreported missing is highly unlikely since Argentina, despite being the 8th largest
country in the world, is for the most part sparsefy populated. One third (11 of 33
million) of the total population Ihres in greater Buenos Aires.'"* In such a society,
a huge cover-up would be rather difBcult (as was the supposed cover-up of the
real number of disappearances).

Over the last few years there has been

increasing financial support firom the Argentine government to families of the
disappeared, which would be a very good incentive for previously unreported
families to report, yet there has not been a significant number of such families
coming forth.
So how would the official figure of 9,000 civilian casualties reflect on the
military's dirty war campaign? Rather than using the military propaganda, I cite
the information given by the heads of the guerrilla movements. Julio Santucho
(the brother of ERP's leader, Roberto) estimates that at the time of the military
coup, although the ERP was militarify incapacitated after the Monte Chingolo
disaster, it had 1,000 members. This added to 3,000 PRT members and 1,000
members of the Guevarist Youth branch of PRT-ERP (juventudguevarista), gives
a total of 5,000 people, of whom Santucho estimates 80 percent disappeared.'"^
The Montoneros at the time of the coup had up to 15,000 generic
members, of whom up to 10,000 were incorporated into the Montonero Army.
The death toll given by the surviving Montoneros is around 5,000 of their
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members.'"" Between the two organizations there is a figure of roughly 8,500
casualties, strikingly close to the official number of the disappeared.

What Were the Disappeared Guilty of?
The only real answer to this question probably lies in the suspected lists
kept by the armed forces, since any such lists might have the reasons for an
individual's disappearance. A logical choice for explanation of the reason for a
disappearance lies in the family of the individual who disappeared, yet precise
information firom these families as to the nature of their child's activities is
extremely difficult to obtain. I interviewed around twenty Mothers of the Plaza
de Mayo and almost all of the Mothers describe their children as simply
"politically active ", yet no Mother is willing to admit a direct link between its child
and the Montoneros or PRT-ERP.'®’ One of the National Commission on the
Disappeared's (CONADEP) mistakes in its report, Nunca Mas (Never Again), was
the complete absence of information on the activities of those who disappeared
and those who testified as to being tortured in the clandestine camps. When
National Commission on the Disappeared member Magdalena Ruiz Guinazu is
asked about this oversight, she responded by saying that many of those
testimonies were by survivors who had been wrongfully detained by just being in
another prisoner's phone book.'"" Although in such a widespread operation as the
military's clandestine campaign there are bound to be such cases, no Mother or
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any other famify members of the disappeared described to me the reason for their
loved ones disappearance as mistaken identity.
Undoubtedty, not everyone who disappeared was a military threat to the
state, as shown by the disappearance of 81 pregnant women and 152 youngsters
under the age of 18.'"" In one of the most infamous of such cases, the "night of
the pencils" {la noche de los Lapices), in which thirteen teenagers who had signed
a petition demanding a cut in bus fares in the city of La Plata were abducted in
their homes and only one would ever re appear. These youngsters were probably
singled out because of their association with the ERP's Youth Branch, the
Guevarist Youth {Juventud Goevarw/a).""
At times the military's crackdown was aimed at those who, according to
Nobel-prize wiimer, Alfredo Perez Equivel, were seen as "potential enemies "
within the military national security doctrine.'" That the war was often directed
at subversive or leftist ideology is evident in one of General Videla's few
comments on the methods of the Dirty War: "A terrorist is not just someone with
a gun or a bomb, he can also be someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to
Western and Christian civilization.""^

Although the exact number of

disappearances by mistaken identity or for personal revenge or profit can never
be found out, military personnel often ransacked a prisoner's home upon the
capture, taking items for personal possession."^
The military also had a habit of carrying out operations against the families
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of a subversive, but in talking to Omar Santucho, a brother of the armed forces
most-wanted subversive, Roberto Santucho, a relative^ different picture is given
of the degree of random violence carried out by the military. Omar, who kept his
distance from his brother's activities and had not seen him during the last five
years of Roberto's life (1971-1976), describes no bad experience with the army
troops stationed in Santiago Del Estero. The only inconvenience was a quiet
watch placed on Omar's house, which after Robert's death in July of 1976 was
completely removed. Of the many other Santucho relatives who also disappeared,
Omar describes them as "involved with Robi's cause.""*
A key military mistake in attempting to legitimize its illegal campaign was
the decision made on April 22, 1976 to ban all news of the Dirty War from the
media. This ban included any mention of subversive attacks. The outside world
came to see this as a brutal one-sided campaign by the military, since those
Montoneros who had managed to escape from Argentina, had set up an
international solidarity program which centered on distributing the news of human
rights abuses taking place in Argentina to foreign governments and press. This
would lead to a great deal of pressure put on the junta by the American
government under Jimmy Carter (1977-81)."^
The international solidarity campaign is also what made the Navy
Mechanics School, ESMA (Escuela de Mecanica de la Armada) in Buenos Aires,
the most notorious of all detention centers, since the great majority of prisoners

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50
there were M o n to n ero sThe few who managed to leave ESMA alive spoke out
about the terrible torture and the death flights in which prisoners would be
thrown firom airplanes into the sea while still alive (although unconscious from an
injection)."’

The Massen-Montonero Connection
A key part of the theory of the Montoneros being secretly backed by the
armed forces (dating back to the Aramburu kidnapping) revolves around the
speculation about a secret meeting in Paris toward the end of 1977 between
Admiral Massera and the Montonero hierarchy in exile. In 1995, Massera stated
that "The Argentine Ambassador in Paris at that time, who's no friend of mine,
can tell you that when I was in Paris, Firmenich was in Sweden," while adding "if
the meeting had been proposed to me, I would have accepted, after all we were
at war.""
All signs, however, point to a failed meeting. Massera at that time had two
big reasons for working out an agreement with the Montoneros, one being his
political ambitions in forming his own party and winning an eventual democratic
election. Massera had already put many of the Montonero prisoners at ESMA on
duty to help his political future by collecting information from of newspapers, and
he would have greatly benefitted from the still abundant Montonero money
overseas.""

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

51
The second reason for a Massera-Afon/onero meeting would be working out
a cease fire for the upcoming 1978 World Cup, when the eyes of the world would
be on Argentina. Massera was unsuccessful on both counts, as his political party
never got off the ground and during the 1978 World Cup there were dozens of
RPG rocket attacks by the Montoneros in Argentina.'’®
The most troubling indication of this secret meeting is the abduction and
murder of Elena Holmberg, an Argentine diplomat in Paris who was apparent^
about to go public in revealing the meeting. Earlier in 1977 there had been a
similar abduction of Hector Hidalgo Sola, the Argentine Ambassador to
Venezuela, who allegedly was about to start his own patty and was being
considered by Videla as an interim president in the case of the military stepping
down.'"
The World Cup attacks by the Montoneros would be their last real
campaign against the military. By 1979 the so-called Afon/o/iero army, which three
years earlier was capable of at least two attacks every day, had disappeared,
mostly due to guerrilla cells with 20 to 25 members being destroyed through
confessions under torture by a single captured guerrilla. The much awaited
Montonero offensive from exile was completely crushed in 1979 as most members
who were executed trying to cross into Argentina were caught at the border and
executed, thus ending the Dirty War.'”
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Table 3: Figures of Subversive Actions
Overview of Subversive Operations According to the Argentine Armed
Forces 1970-1979
Total Number of Attacks Attributed to Subversives

1,153

Total Number of Armed Forces Deaths Attributed to Subversion

539

Total Number of Deaths Attributed to Subversion

687

Source: Las Cifras de la Guerra Sucia (1985) 23, 27.
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CONCLUSION
AFTERMATH: THE MILITARY’S OVERAMBITTON
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
In hindsight, 1979 is not onfy significant because it marked the end of the
Dirty War, but because decisions made by the military government would
eventually discredit the whole process of wiping out subversion by the armed
forces as a self-serving genocide.
The most important development was the decision not to start a transition
back to democracy. Although no definite timetable was given by the military
upon taking power, the general sentiment was for a gradual transition starting
with municipal elections in three to four years'” and eventually culminating in
presidential elections. This timeline would allow Martinez de Hoz the full five
years his economic plan required.
By the end of 1978 the overall situation seemed perfect for the
announcement of a transition plan; the Dirty War was winding down toward a
complete victory for the military, the economy had made a significant turnaround,
especially for the middle class who, with a very favorable peso-to-dollar exchange
rate, were able to indulge in foreign vacations and buying sprees.'’*

53
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Admiral Massera, for one, was apparent^ convinced of a relatively
imminent change in government, as upon retiring from the ruling junta in 1978
he put all his attention into heading a new political party. The leading figures of
the Perônist party were also beginning to be released from prison. Yet apparently
the leading military figures took all the positive developments as a mandate for
their ability to govern the nation.
From that point on the military seemed to have no intention whatsoever
of relinquishing power. In 1981, when General Roberto Viola took over the
presidency from Videla, he was regarded as being receptive to a return to
democracy, yet as his drastic overhaul of the economy (engineered by Martinez
del Hoz) and the subsequent palace coup'” which brought General Leopoldo
Galitieri (long œnsidered an ambitious hardliner) into power showed that the
military still had long-term plans.
The most important aspect of the post-1979 (Dirty War) era is the fact that
the disappearances continued in steady decline while public opposition to the
military government rose in terms of strikes and public protests. (See Table 2).
This is a strong indication that the military's repression was not on the basis of
complete self-interest, as by 1982 the strikes and protests had reached such a level
that the military government was to a certain extent backed into a comer.'”
The decision taken by the junta to occupy the long disputed
Falklands/Malvinas Islands off the coast of Argentina by force on April 2, 1982
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had many different motives. Possibly the most important motive was to attempt
to revitalize El Proceso. Moreover, Galtieri may have sought to gain maximum
support from the public for his candidaxy in a democratic election to be scheduled
as soon as the conflict was over and the issue of the Islands finally settled in
Argentina's favor.
Instead, after British troops managed to re-occupy the Islands by June
1982 following a short yet blooxty war, the military government was left in the
precarious position of being defeated both militarily and political^, and what has
followed has been an unprecedented series of events as far as civil-military
relations, not only in Argentina but in all of Latin America. Since the interim
government was in no position to work out an amnesty agreement for acts
committed by military personnel during the Dirty War (which would have been
a certainty in 1979-80), not only were dozens of rank and file military personnel
prosecuted and jailed, even the junta members faced trial and the key figures
(Massera, Videla) would serve 5 years of a life sentence (1985-90) in jail.'” In
1995, the current heads of each branch of the Argentine armed forces issued their
own respectiveawrocriricar (self criticisms) regarding their branches' actions during
the Dirty War.'”
As outlined earlier, much critical information regarding the Dirty War
(mostly facts and figures) remains unknown, in doubt, or disputed, yet as far as
the Argentine armed forces are concerned, or at least those involved directly in
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the Dirty War, the major source of their difficulties seems to lie in
overambitiousness.

No matter how terrible their acts were, no major

consequences would have likefy resulted from their anti-subversive campaign, as
was the case in other Latin American conflicts with extensive human rights
violations by the armed forces, with minor exceptions, had they known when to
leave power once the real agendas of the national reorganization undertaken by
the El Proceso were completed during the years 1979-1980.
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^David Rock, Authoritarian Argentina, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
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1991) 79.
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1/31/72
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“’Seoane, Ibid, at 149.
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“John Simpson and Jana Bennet, The Disappeared and the Mothers o f The Plaza,
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985) 36.
“ Gillespie, supra note 8, at 225.
“ Personal interview in Buenos Aires, June 1995.
“ Simpson and Bennet, supra note 57.
“ Pagina 12/, Buenos Aires, March 24,1996, pages 2-3.
“ Andersen, supra note 37, at epilogue.
“ Simpson and Bennet, supra note 57, at 35.
""For more information on martinez de Hoz see Alberto Jordan, El Proceso, 197683 (Buenos Aires: Emece Editores, 1993) Chapter 8.
"'For more information on Argentina's economic structure and history see Daniel
Poneman, Argentina: Democracy on Trial (New York: Paragon Books, 1987)
Chapter 8.
"’Personal interview in Buenos Aires, August 1995.
""Figures from Lista de los Detenidos - Desapareceidos Regfstrados in la Asamblea
Permeanente por los Derechos Humanos,A (1985). Students rated second on the
list (33 percent).
"^Hodges, supra note 17, at Chapter 8.
""For more information on economic repression see Dr. David Pion-Berlin, The
Ideology o f State Terror: Economic Doctrine and Political Repression in Peru and
Argentina, (Boulder: Rienner Publishers, 1989) Chapters 4 and 5.
""According to the files given to the Human Rights Assembly the last subversive
attack took place on 11/13/79.
"’Crawley, supra note 5, at 433.
""All figures from Las Cifras de la Guerra Sucia, (Buenos Aires, 1985).
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“ The commission appointed by the new democratic president Raul Alfonsin was
composed of public figures in different fields. It was headed by the writer
Ernesto Sabato. For all of National Commission on the Disappeared's findings
see Nunca Mas, Buenos Aires (1984).
'“La Historia de las Madres de Plaza de Mayo: Buenos Aires (1995) documentes
Pagina 12/.
'"'Information on Tucuman firom various local personal interviews; Clarin, The
New List of Disappeared (Buenos Aires) April 1, 1995,1-5.
'"’Information firom three ex-military personnel who prefer anonymity. Interviews
conducted in Buenos Aires, May, June, 1995.
'""Personal interview in Buenos Airs, May 1995.
'"^And more than 80 percent are urban dwellers.
'""Personal interview in Buenos Aires, July 1995.
'""Information given by four ex-Montoneros during personal interviews conducted
in Buenos Aires June-July, 1995.
'"’Interviews conducted throughout Argentina from January until September,
1995.
‘""Personal interview in Buenos Aires, April 1995.
'""Supra note 17.
""Personal interview with Pablo Diaz (the lone survivor) in La Plata, August 1995.
‘"Quote from personal interview in Buenos Aires, July 1995.
"’Simpson and Bennet, supra note 57, at 81.
""See La Sentencia, Buenos Aires 1987, Congreso de la Nacion, pages 13-35.
"^Personal interview in Santiago Del Estero, August 1995.
""Details of the Montonero solidarity program from supra note 6.
""Interview with former ESMA prisoner Ana Testa, Buenos Aires, June 25,1995.
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"^See Horacio Verbitsky, El Vuelo, Buenos Aires (1995), Planeta.
^^^Gente (Buenos Aires), Juty 27,1995, 55.
"^Gillespie, supran note 8, at 241-50.
‘“ Ibid, at 257-58.
‘^‘For more information on these cases see Claudio Uriarte, Almirante Cero,
(Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992).
‘“ Gillespie, stqtra note 8, at 262-65.
‘“ Information from various accounts of personal conversations, from confidential
sources, with General Videla. Interviews conducted in Buenos Aires, March 1995.
‘“ See Jordan, supra note 64, at Chapter 9.
‘“ See Jordan, supra note 64, at Chapter 14.
‘“ See Hodges, supra note 17.
‘“ There were nearly 2,500 cases pending in a year after Alfonsin took power
(1984). The Punto Final and Due Obedience laws eliminated the great majority
of these cases. Three different Army uprisings in protest of the prosecution of
military personnel was instrumental in getting Alfonsin to introduce these laws to
Congress. In December of 1990 all the remaining Dirty War figures in prison
(including Videla, Massera and Firmenich) were given a pardon by President
Menem.
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